• Why reapportionment made the North more liberal, but the South more conservative

• Why the Civil Rights Act would be harder to imple

  ment without reapportionment

• How reapportionment paved the way for party realignment

“I can stay here as long as you can!” declares the senator from Northern California. “And I can stay here as long as you can,” dutifully retorts the southerner.[1]

It’s Monday, April 18, 1921. We’re in the California State Senate in Sacramento. The room is deep red. The carpet, the heavy draperies, the upholstery on the chairs—all red, all borrowed, deliberately, from the British House of Lords. It’s dim.

Forty desks face the dais in tight curving rows. An enormous chandelier hangs overhead.

Carved into the cornice, above the rostrum, the Latin motto: SENATORIS EST CIVITATIS LIBERTATEM TUERI—it is the duty of a senator to guard the liberty of the Commonwealth.[2]

The California Constitution says representation “shall be apportioned according to population.” After each census, the legislature must redraw the districts.

Senator Frank Boggs introduced the first bill of this legislative session, to do exactly that. It’s labeled “Senate Bill 1,” or S.B. 1.

***

Senator Boggs is convinced his bill will pass—if only he can get it to a vote.

But Senator Walter McDonald of San Francisco has made it his personal mission to keep the bill from reaching a vote.

For months, he has campaigned against the reapportionment plan. “If we permit a reapportionment on the proposed basis,” he warned in January, “We may as well divide the State.”[3]

At 10:30 a.m., the Senate Journal records: “Bill read second time. Committee amendments pending.”[4] S.B. 1 is now on the floor, slated for a vote today.

McDonald is worried. “They’ve slipped,” he says of his fellow opponents. “We’ve got to fight for time.”[5]

At 11:00 a.m., before the Senate can vote on any amendment, McDonald rises. “Mr. President,” he announces, “I move to place Senate Bill 1 at the foot of the second reading file.”[6]

That is: beneath every other bill, unlikely to be reached before the end of the session. Defeat through delay.

The Senate Journal records, impassively: “Motion seconded.”[7]

McDonald declares he will use “every means” to defeat reapportionment, including demanding a separate roll call on eighty-four amendments.[8]

The lieutenant-governor suggests this would cause delay.

“I object to the presiding officer of this Senate explaining this bill to the advantage of its proponents,” an opponent of reapportionment protests. “As long as we beat this bill, I don’t care if we pass no other measure.”[9]

Eventually the Secretary calls the roll on McDonald’s motion. If it passes, S.B. 1is very likely dead.

“Allen” “Nay”

“Anderson” No response

“Arbuckle” “Aye”

It’s going to be close.

***

Since the 1910 census, California’s population has grown 44 percent. There are a million new Californians.[10]

But the growth has not been even. Los Angeles County has nearly doubled. Some northern districts have shrunk.

As a result, one northern Sierra senator represents about 43,000 people, while one Los Angeles senator represents about 117,000. One voter has three times the representation of the other.[11]

This is an instance of a national pattern.

Land has always promised self-reliance—the American virtue—and wealth, the American dream. In 1910, most Americans still lived on farms or in villages of fewer than 2,500 people.

But the country is changing. Over the last decade, six million Americans have left farms for cities.[12] By 1920, for the first time in American history, most Americans live in urban places.[13]

The city throws up a new landscape—skyscrapers and apartment houses, speakeasies and department stores. The livery stable becomes a gas station.[14] Great writers portray small-town life, once the nation’s moral center, as narrow, stifling, and provincial.[15]

There’s a backlash. To a turn-of-the-century politician, writes William Leuchtenburg, “no asset was greater than that of birth in a log cabin.”[16] The Ku Klux Klan has exploded in membership, strongest in places where old-stock Protestants feel themselves being overtaken by an America becoming Catholic, Jewish, immigrant, Black, wet, and urban.[17]

The old America clings to its institutional advantage. By 1921, Alabama, Kansas, Michigan, Oklahoma, and Tennessee have all failed to redraw districts. For the first time in history, Congress has failed to reapportion after the 1920 census.

It’s a battle between two Americas, described by Walter Lippmann as “the new urban civilization with its irresistible economic and scientific and mass power,” and “the older American village civilization making its last stand against what looks like an alien invasion.”[18]

On April 18, 1921, California is at its center.

***

Back in the Senate chamber, the Secretary is still calling the roll. It’s close, but the motion loses, 18 to 15, with 7 absent. Those seven absences give McDonald his opening.

Before the secretary can proclaim that McDonald’s motion has failed, McDonald rises again.

“I move for a call of the Senate.”

The Senate Journal records dryly: “Pending the announcement of the vote, Senator McDonald moved for a call of the Senate. Motion carried.”

It continues: “Time, eleven o’clock and twenty-five minutes a.m. The President directed the Sergeant-at-Arms to close the doors.”[19] The sergeant-at-arms is sent to find the absent senators.

A call is an old attendance rule.[20] But California’s rule has a wrinkle. Ordinary business cannot continue without the unanimous agreement of every present member.[21] Many legislatures allow business to move under a call if there is a quorum—California does not.

To pass, S.B. 1 will need twenty-one votes, an absolute majority of the forty-member Senate. Both sides believe they have the votes: “We’ve got enough votes to put it through,” says Boggs. “Go ahead and try . . . . You haven’t got the votes,” responds Senator Crowley of San Francisco.[22]

Neither side has twenty-one in the room, so both sides have reason to gamble.

The vote is suspended; the chamber is sealed.[23] Since McDonald can withhold his assent, he can stop the Senate from doing almost anything else. It’s a filibuster.

The newspapers capture the stalled chamber.

The Bee says Senators were “locked up.”[24] “McDonald tied up the Senate,” says The Examiner. “Nothing was done,” the paper continued—“and it was fully demonstrated that time, if made for slaves, was not made for State Senators of California.”[25]

Some clerical business does continue, but important matters are frozen.

Eventually, the call of the Senate will be lifted. There will be a deal, or absent members will show up. But even then, McDonald wields a potent threat. The reapportionment bill carried eighty-four amendments out of committee. McDonald will demand a separate roll call on each.

“I don’t want to block good legislation,” McDonald tells his colleagues, “But I propose to have a roll call on everything.”[26]

“It looks as if he could hold us here for at least 48 hours,” admits one pro-reapportionment senator. “We cannot prevent roll call after roll call.”[27]

The Chronicle reports, “McDonald had demanded a separate roll call on eighty-four amendments to the Boggs bill. Lieutenant-Governor Young . . . suggested this would cause serious delay.”[28]

That, lieutenant-governor, is the point.

***

Thomas Jefferson opens his Manual of Parliamentary Practice with Arthur Onslow, the longest-serving Speaker of the House of Commons. Onslow taught that parliamentary rules are “a check and control” on the majority, “a shelter and protection to the minority.” The majority has numbers, the minority has rules. Procedure is a check, Jefferson says, on “the wantonness of power.”[29]

Modern constitutional scholars make a similar point. Sujit Choudhry calls some legislative procedures “opposition rights”: procedural rules that let a minority scrutinize, delay, demand answers, and force questions into public view. Democracy, he argues, needs a “regime of opposition rights.”[30] But those rights, in his account, are different from supermajority rules. Opposition rights should not replace majority rule.[31]

***

At 1:45 in the afternoon, McDonald is seized by grace, or just hunger. The rules say no recess can be taken during a call. McDonald offers a “gentleman’s agreement” for a lunch recess.[32]

What’s a rule among gentlemen?

Almost all members sign.[33] One senator from Los Angeles, asked to sign, cracks: “I don’t see the names of any gentlemen signed to it.”[34]

***

How does McDonald get anywhere close to half of the Senate to subvert a constitutional duty?

Two ingredients: local interest and North-South politics.

Los Angeles has grown the most and needs more senate districts. For every new district, some other districts have to be merged.

San Francisco is set to lose a district, having already lost two districts following the last census. The entire San Francisco delegation—seven men, including McDonald—oppose redistricting.

Santa Clara County is set to lose one of its senators. One of the county’s senators concedes the arithmetic. “Santa Clara has population for one senator and a sixth,” he says. “The trouble is we cannot make one sixth into a whole.”[35] He understands the county doesn’t have enough people to justify two districts—and votes against reapportionment anyway.[36]

Sometimes the losers are created by chain reaction. District 17 needs more people. Boggs proposes adding Santa Barbara, which pulls it out of a district with Ventura. Ventura needs a new partner, and the only adjacent county large enough is Kern. Boggs glues the two together.

The senator from Ventura is furious. The pairing is “intolerable,” he writes, “since there is practically no community of interest between the two counties.” Kern is more populous, he continues, so Ventura “would be simply the tail of the dog.”[37]

Even within counties, the politics are deeply local. Chico, the largest city in Butte County, favors a plan joining Butte with a mountain county,[38] creating a district with stronger timber and mineral interest. Gridley, a smaller farming town in the same county, wants the district to stay agricultural.[39]

In the end, the Boggs plan would essentially keep District 6 unchanged, swapping one small Sacramento Valley farm county for another.[40] Senator Duncan—a farmer’s senator—should be happy.

Yet he opposes the bill. He is one of the senators who intends to demand a roll call on every one of 84 amendments.[41] It’s he who shouts, at another senator on the Senate floor: “I can stay here as long as you can!”[42]

What explains his opposition? “I don’t see what Los Angeles is all het up about,” he tells the Bee.[43]

This is the regional dimension of the conflict. The Sacramento Bee’s front-page session preview framed reapportionment as a coming North-South fight. Under the heading “Reapportionment Battle,” it warned that Los Angeles County would seek increased representation because of its population growth, while San Francisco, “with the support of the Northern Legislators,” would fight the Los Angeles contingent “to the last ditch.”[44]

Los Angeles has its own distinct interests. It is more dry than San Francisco. San Francisco is the most unionized city in the state; Los Angeles is famous as an open-shop city. But more than any policy issue, reapportionment is a power struggle between the old northern coalition and the young southern metropolis.

McDonald says as much: “If we permit a reapportionment on the proposed basis that would give Los Angeles county twenty-one Assemblymen and ten Senators we may as well divide the State.”[45]

And the divide runs both ways. San Diego’s district is entirely unchanged. But San Diego is in southern California, and its senator confronts the San Francisco delegation: “What’s the matter with you San Franciscans?... Why do you block everything in this way?”

Crowley fires back: “What’s the matter with you Southerners? . . . You want to grab everything; why don’t you divide the State?”

“We love you too much.”[46]

***

The Senators return, “with reapportionment in the same condition as before feeding time.”[47]

Boggs still has the votes. What he does not have is a vote. “I have enough votes to pass my bill if I can ever get it to a vote,” he says. “If I cannot get it to a vote, why I have done my best, that’s all.”[48]

Several Senators try to reach the governor. If the governor promises a special session, just for reapportionment, perhaps they can find a way out of this wretched chamber.[49]

It’s 5:15 now. We’ve been locked in for six hours. The Senate “killed time all day long,” reports The Chronicle, with Senators “amusing themselves in various ways while enduring their confinement.”

Over the day, three additional senators have arrived in the chamber. Four absentees remain.

McDonald moves to end the call of the Senate. Perhaps he was hoping the newly-arrived senators would help. The Senate Journal records: “The Secretary was directed to call the roll, on Senator McDonald’s motion, of the Senators who had not answered to their names.”

McDonald loses 16 to 20.[50] Two of the newly arrived Senators vote against his motion. Boggs appears a single vote away from having enough votes to pass S.B. 1.

Has McDonald miscalculated?

McDonald rises again. He moves for the bill to be re-referred to committee.

This would delay final vote by another day. There are only four days of the session left.

Boggs, the bill’s sponsor, says sending the bill back to committee would mean its defeat. Another senator offers a similar prognosis: “If the Senate sends this bill back to committee, it will be evading its constitutional duty.”[51]

The Secretary calls a vote. One by one, the Senators respond.

McDonald’s new delay motion is on the brink of passing. Several senators have changed their vote.

Senator Chamberlin, who favors reapportionment, interrupts the vote and moves to freeze the Senate.

It’s the same tactic McDonald used six hours earlier. But this time it’s made by the other side. The Senate Journal records: “Pending the announcement of the vote, Senator Chamberlin moved a call of the Senate.”

It continues: “Time, five o’clock and forty-five minutes p.m. The President directed the Sergeant-at-Arms to close the doors.”

The Senate is sealed again, but now the pro-reapportionment side is scrambling. Over the next ninety minutes, two more Senators arrive.

At 7:10 p.m., Senator Chamberlin releases the call. The Secretary calls the roll.

***

A few hours ago, 20 Senators voted against McDonald. During the call, one more pro-reapportionment senator entered the chamber. They have an absolute majority. Boggs appears correct: if they can get it to a vote, they will prevail.

But can they hold together?

Boggs is from the San Joaquin Valley. This sprawling region between the Sierra Nevada and the Coast Ranges is neither northern nor southern California. This geographic neutrality makes Boggs a suitable author of the bill.

The day after Boggs introduced S.B. 1—on January 6, 1921—the four senators from the San Joaquin Valley met at the Hotel Land in Sacramento, and pledged their support for the bill.[52] This may be what gives Boggs confidence in the bill’s passage—if the North locks horns with the South, Central Valley Senators break the tie.

Prohibition is the other major issue on the 1921 legislative agenda. Reapportionment and prohibition, reports the Appeal-Democrat, are the “grim spectres” of this legislative session.[53]

Senator Harris is one of the four San Joaquin senators who pledged their support for S.B. 1.

The same day Boggs introduced S.B. 1, Harris introduces S.B. 4. It’s a dry bill, instructing California officials to enforce federal prohibition law.

Harris’s bill has not yet had a second reading in the Senate.[54] Harris has every reason to fear that a prolonged filibuster over reapportionment will jeopardize it.

On the other side of both fights stands the same man. McDonald is the floor leader of the wet bloc, the man who will orchestrate the opposition to Harris’s dry bill.[55] Perhaps McDonald can kill two bills with one stone.

Harris switches his vote. He cannot afford more delay.

***

The motion passes. Twenty-two to sixteen.[56] S.B. 1 goes back to committee. Officially, only until tomorrow. In practice, Boggs believes, the bill has just been killed.

Five senators have switched. Harris is joined by three more drys: Dennett, also of the San Joaquin Valley, Nelson,[57] of the state’s far north, and Newton Allen, of Los Angeles.

Inman of Sacramento switches too. Inman is a wet, but he is fed up with the delay. “We are rapidly getting into a jam,” he says, “and literally hundreds of bills will die in committee.”[58]

But it is Allen who takes the blame, because he is from Los Angeles.

“All Blame Allen” reads an L.A. Times subhead.[59] The article continues, “L.A. city and county legislators joined in warm denunciation of Senator Newton M. Allen of L.A.”

Assemblyman Lyon says, “I lay the blame . . . at Allen’s door.” Senator Chamberlin goes further: Allen, he says, has “proved his disloyalty to the south.” [60]

The pro-reapportionment side manages one last gesture. The Senate votes that S.B. 1 must be returned from committee no later than noon the next day.[61]

But several senators already understand what has happened. Sending the bill back to committee, Boggs says, “meant its defeat.”

***

The Reapportionment Committee meets the next morning and tries to redraw the map one more time.[62] The committee tries to win back Ventura by leaving it alone and moving Kern elsewhere. But Kern has to go somewhere, and now the senator from neighboring Kings County objects. It’s a one-for-one trade; S.B. 1 is no stronger than before.

At noon, a meeting takes place at the Governor William Stephens’ office.

For months, the governor had maintained a “hands-off policy” on reapportionment.[63] He was from Los Angeles, and the southern delegation hoped for his support. But support would mean choosing Los Angeles over San Francisco, South over North. Stephens stayed out.[64]

McDonald’s delay tactics create a new problem. If the filibuster continues, the governor’s own economic and government-reorganization bills may die on the calendar.[65]

The governor offers an exit. He promises to call a special session for reapportionment.

Publicly, Stephens keeps his distance. Redistricting, he tells reporters, is “exclusively the Legislature’s concern.”[66] Privately, his representatives inform key senators of the promise.[67]

It’s an off ramp.

At 5:00 p.m., a pro-reapportionment senator introduces a resolution. It reads, in part:

WHEREAS, It is the constitutional duty of the Legislature to pass legislation reapportioning the State . . . in this session . . .

WHEREAS, This Senate is of the belief that any attempt to reapportion the State . . . in this session . . . will probably result in the defeat of very important legislation . . .

Therefore, be it Resolved . . . . That further consideration of all reapportionment matters be postponed . . . and that the Governor . . . is hereby requested to call a special session . . . [68]

The resolution is adopted, 26 to 6. Boggs himself advocates in favor. He, too, wants to get to other matters.[69]

The bill is referred back to committee—this time, permanently.

***

In 1689, John Locke described what would become the problem of redistricting. As populations shift, a town where “more inhabitants than a Shepherd is to be found” can send as many legislators “as a whole County numerous in People, and powerful in riches.” If representation is fixed by the Constitution, this creates an “inconvenience . . . incapable of remedy.”[70]

American constitutional law tried to answer Locke’s problem with the census: count the people every ten years, then reapportion and redraw. In theory, courts could complete the design: if legislatures fail, courts can compel compliance.

John Hart Ely would describe reapportionment as exactly the type of democratic failure that corrupts the political process and deepens over time. When beneficiaries control the instruments of repair, judicial intervention may be necessary to break institutional capture.

But there is a rising academic chorus questioning the wisdom of judicial supremacy. Niko Bowie—who taught me constitutional law—argues that the Supreme Court should not have the power to strike down federal law. He cites a long history of the Supreme Court invalidating laws that banned the spread of slavery, protected voting rights, prohibited discrimination, and outlawed child labor, among others.[71] Elected institutions, then, would bear the ultimate constitutional responsibility. Bowie is arguing principally about federal courts striking down federal law. But he might say that state courts’ long failure to stop malapportionment shows that courts, too, are unreliable arbiters of political process.

If courts are unreliable and legislatures self-interested, who remains?

***

The L.A. Times runs the headline “DODGING THE POINT.” “Surely the property owner in the roaring town is entitled to a representation equal to the man in the field or forest.”[72]

The S.F. Chronicle quotes the Constitution verbatim, concluding: “Sectional differences are no justification for violating the Constitution.”[73]

The off-ramp was the promise of a special session. It never takes place.

For months, a special session seemed “very probable,”[74] although the governor, reported the L.A. Times, is “taking his time on the matter.”[75]

The political problem is the same: the governor worries that a special session would force him to take a sectional position. One journalist describes the governor as “somewhat nonplussed.”[76]

Ten months after the lock-in, the governor publicly polls legislators, asking whether a reapportionment measure “could be enacted.”[77] Turning a decision into a consultation—the oldest trick in the book.

On March 4, 1922, the governor announces that his poll demonstrated reapportionment to be “hopeless.”[78] There will be no special session.

The L.A. Times has the last word: “The apportionment is mandatory, but what is a mandate between politicians?”[79]

[1] Kenneth C. Adams, Redistricting Bill Sent Back To Committee, S.F. Chron., Apr. 19, 1921, at 2, col. 2.

[2] California State Senate, 1935, Calisphere, http://calisphere.org/item/ade91fb4f1f7ecf01bff6c553b5a4a3c/ (last visited June 9, 2026); California Legislature, Senate Chamber, Calisphere, https://calisphere.org/item/385e7c8d9a3ab8b0c2bcbfb672f5e7a1/ (last visited June 9, 2026).

[3] Associated Press, Want Another Farm School, L.A. Times, Jan. 05, 1921, at 2.

[4] Journal of the Senate During the Forty-Fourth Session of the Legislature of the State of California 1542 (1921).

[5] Edward W. Hamilton, Apportionment Deadlocks Senate; All Work Stopped for Hours; North Lacks Votes to Kill Bill, S.F. Examiner, Apr. 19, 1921, at 4, col. 1.

[6] Adams, supra note 1, at 1.

[7] Senate Journal, supra note 4, at 1542.

[8] Reapportionment Causes Deadlock in Upper House, Sacramento Bee, Apr. 18, 1921, at 11.

[9] Reapportionment Causes Deadlock, supra note 8, at 11.

[10] U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Population: California (1921).

[11] Id.

[12] William E. Leuchtenburg, The Perils of Prosperity, 1914–32 225 (1958).

[13] U.S. Bureau of the Census, Fourteenth Census of the United States: 1920, Population, Volume I: Number and Distribution of Inhabitants 51 tbl.16 (1921).

[14] Leuchtenburg, supra note 12, at 2.

[15] Id.

[16] Id. at 229.

[17] Id. at 209-10.

[18] Pamela S. Karlan, Reapportionment, Nonapportionment, and Recovering Some Lost History of One Person, One Vote, 59 Wm & Mary L. Rev. 1921, 1935 (2018) (quoting Walter Lippmann, Men of Destiny 28 (1927)).

[19] Senate Journal, supra note 4, at 1542.

[20] Paul Mason, Mason’s Manual of Legislative Procedure §§ 190-191, at 155-156 (2010 ed.).

[21] Cal. Legislature, Rules of the Two Houses of the California Legislature 75 (1921).

[22] Hamilton, supra note 5, at 4, col. 1.

[23] Rules of the Two Houses, supra note 21, at 184.

[24] Reapportionment Causes Deadlock, supra note 8, at 1.

[25] Hamilton, supra note 5, at 4, col. 2.

[26] Id. col. 1.

[27] Id. col. 2.

[28] Adams, supra note 1, at 2.

[29] Jefferson’s Manual of Parliamentary Practice 1, in Constitution, Jefferson’s Manual, and Rules of the House of Representatives, H.R. Doc. No. 107-284, at 125-128 (2003).

[30] Sujit Choudhry, Opposition Powers in Parliamentary Democracies 40 (Apr. 22, 2026) (unpublished manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract=6628138.

[31] Id. at 14-15.

[32] Hamilton, supra note 5, at 4, col. 2.

[33] Reapportionment Causes Deadlock, supra note 8, at 1.

[34] Hamilton, supra note 5, at 4, col. 2.

[35] Edward H. Hamilton, Young Praised for Impartiality; 3 S.F. Solons on HIs Committee; Senate Favors Boggs’ Measure, S.F. Examiner, Jan. 6, 1921, at 2.

[36] Another example of legislative self-interest is District 4: one of the least populated districts in the state, awkwardly combining agricultural and timber counties, and thus an obvious target for elimination. Its senator, naturally, saw the matter differently.

[37] Arbuckle and Hume are Making Fight on Reapportionment, Ventura Weekly Post, Jan. 21, 1921, at 6.

[38] Butte County Fight Looms In Assembly, Sacramento Bee, Jan. 19, 1921, at 11.

[39] The Gridley Chamber of Commerce argues that, since “timber, mineral and hydro-electric interests, are controlled mostly by large corporations with headquarters in the larger cities,” they are sufficiently represented, and District 6 should be made up of Valley farm districts. Sutter and Butte Best District, Gridley Herald, Jan. 19, 1921, at 1.

[40] Yolo would be swapped for neighboring Glenn. They vote similarly—in 1920, 62 percent of Yolo and 64 percent of Glenn voted for President Harding. Cal. Sec’y of State, Statement of the Vote at General Election Held On November 2, 1920 (1920) Both Chico, the city, and Gridley, the farm town, were open to the addition of Glenn. Sutter and Butte Best District, supra note 39; Butte County Fight Looms, supra note 38.

[41] Bill on State Districts May Fail In Senate, Sacramento Union, Apr. 19, 1921, at 2.

[42] Adams, supra note 1, at 2.

[43] Duncan Sees No Reason for Excitement In the South, Sacramento Bee, Sept. 17, 1921, at 30.

[44] Forty-Fourth Legislature to Open Monday, Sacramento Bee, Jan. 1, 1921, at 1.

[45] Associated Press, supra note 3, at 2.

[46] Hamilton, supra note 5, at 4, col. 2.

[47] Id.

[48] Id.

[49] Reapportionment Causes Deadlock, supra note 8, at 11; Hamilton, supra note 5, at 4.

[50] Senate Journal, supra note 4, at 1572.

[51] Boggs’ Measure Sent Back To Committee, Sacramento Bee, Apr. 19, 1921, at 11.

[52] San Joaquin Valley Representatives Meet, Sacramento Bee, Jan. 7, 1921, p. 11.

[53] New Assembly Lineup Also Scheduled By Legislature, Marysville Appeal, Jan. 6, 1921, p. 1.

[54] Senate Journal, supra note 4, at 1619.

[55] Franklin Hichborn, Story of the Session of the California Legislature of 1921 284 (1922).

[56] Senate Journal, supra note 4, at 1581.

[57] Hichborn, supra note 55, at 283-284 nn.220 & 222.

[58] Reapportionment Bill Attacked, Bakersfield Morning Echo, Apr. 19, 1921, at 4.

[59] Kyle D. Palmer, Boggs Measure is Dead Issue, L.A. Times, Apr. 20, 1921, at 2.

[60] Id.

[61] Senate Journal, supra note 4, at 1581.

[62] Boggs Bill, Amended, Reported out Again By Senate Committee, Sacramento Bee, Apr. 19, 1921, at 6.

[63] Kyle D. Palmer, Extra Session Seems Likely, L.A. Times, Apr. 18, 1921, at 2.

[64] Id.

[65] Chronicle Bureau, Redistricting Bill Is Chloroformed; Senate to Request Special Session, S.F. Chronicle, Apr. 20, 1921, at. 3.

[66] Id. at 1.

[67] Special Session of Legislature is Expected, Sacramento Bee, Apr. 20, 1921, at 1. But see Palmer, supra note 59 (”Yes,” replied Inman, “I did talk with Mr. Madsen, but I have absolutely no agreement or understanding of agreement with the Governor’s office.”).

[68] Senate Journal, supra note 4, at 1621.

[69] Special Session, supra note 67.

[70] John Locke, Second Treatise of Government ch. XIII, § 157 (1690).

[71] Nikolas Bowie, The Contemporary Debate over Supreme Court Reform 4 (June 30, 2021), https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/Bowie-SCOTUS-Testimony-1.pdf.

[72] Dodging the Point, L.A. Times, Apr. 20, 1921, at 22.

[73] Redistricting the State, S.F. Chronicle, Apr. 20, 1921, at 22.

[74] Special Session May Be Called Before June 1st, Sacramento Bee, Jan. 4, 1922, at 1.

[75] News of the Capital, L.A. Times, Jan. 22, 1922, at 4.

[76] Id. at 84.

[77] Governor Asks Views Of Legislators on Re-Apportionment, Sacramento Union, Feb. 27, 1922, at 1.

[78] Governor Decides There Will Be No Special Session, Sacramento Bee, March 4, 1922, at 1.

[79] The Artful Dodger, L.A. Times, March 7, 1922, at 22.